14.02.2012
Turkish comp. Law is similar to European Comp. Law
(except some points).
TFEU art
101,
102.
102.
27 members à Customs
Union
It is quite about comp. Law → why similar?
It is quite about comp. Law → why similar?
1999 (Ankara
State & state inst. → addressee (free
movement of goods) →
difference
Measure taken by individuals → competition law
Art. 101:
Art. Prohibits undertakings to infringe comp.
within the ter. of c.u. by agreement or by practising. It only concerns about
undertakings. Possible effect bile olsa comp. (it falls under the scope of art.
101)
Undertaking → broad sense : defined by European
court of justice. Because there is no definition in art. 101
Türk hukukunda tanım vardır. Ankara
Today we are going to only discuss how ECJ
defined the term ‘’undertaking’’
CASE: HÖFNER
Any entity engaged in an economic activity regardless of its stateless and the way in which it is
financed.
1)
We should not only understand companies
We are
not looking for legal personality
Foundations,
lawyers, doctors… are considered as undertakings
2)
State banks: they perform economic activity/service
Yani önemli olan bir ekonomik faaliyette
bulunması. Nasıl para elde ettiği değil.
CASE: WORLD CUP 1999
FIFA. Italian football ass. reklamla ilgili
anlaşma yaptılar ve eco. activity. It is enough.
State school → economic activity YOK
rent a place to service special
activities, economic activity, entity, art 101 VAR
- Public Authority : Whether the public entity provides a
good or service by using their statues and power of just for fulfilling the
legal provisions of that entity (security services)
- Bazı durumlarda önemlidir, kaçılabilir
101’den
Public Entity → performs an activity
Genova Part Case
It is a test to protect he environment.
It comes from the public authority
The limited comp. Will not fall under the
prohibition of art. 101
Ücret unilateral kararlaştırılıyor
- Getting profit is irrelevant/immaterial. How
established ,………………….(burayı anlayamadım)
Daughter/ Sister comp. ? One entity or two different entities ?
(eco. independency) (Legal
independency)
↓
↓
Art. 101 X(uygulanmaz) Art. 101 √
(uygulanır)
Önemli olan ekonomik bağımsızlıktır (Eoropean
Court of J.).
Ekonomik bağımsızlık yoksa etk şirket
olacaktır, 101 uygulanmaz.
Undertaking
(not only companies but also private personalities like football ass.) →
any personality that carries out an eco. activity
Entity undertaking değilse 101 uygulanmaz.
Rekabet kanunu md 4-5de yazıyor.
Material Scope of 101
Prohibits 3 things → 1) agreements by undertakings
2) decisions of ass of undertakings
3) concerted practicing
a…….e → agreement samples. It is not
numerous clauses
a)
Fiyatı sabitleyen sözleşme (pushes smaller companies out of the market)
-
Sadece iki taraflı imzalan sözleşmeler değil, her türlü sözleşme buraya
giriyor. Bağlayıcı, olmasa bile pazarı olumsuz etkiliyorsa 101’e girer. Bağlayıcı, sözlü, yazılı fark etmez. Önemli
olan bir amaca ulaşmasıdır.
ECJ: Joint Intention → Aynı yönde irade olmalı ( marketi 2’ye
bölecek). İmzasız olsa bile 101’e girer.
ECJ: Comp.
ile ilgili bir meetinge katılmak bile yeterli. Burada sözleşme vardır. Hatta
bilmeden katıldım sonra terk ettim desende 101’e girer. It will be enough to
say there is an angreement.
101→ Agreement (her sözleşme
değil, comp. a yönelik sözleşmeler)
Undertakings must be eco.
independent.
It can be only breached by
undertakings.
21 Şubat 2012
Article 101
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the internal market all agreements between undertakings, decisions by
associations of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade
between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market, and in
particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling
prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical
development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive
disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions
prohibited pursuant to this article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
—any agreement or
category of agreements between undertakings,
—any decision or
category of decisions by associations of undertakings,
—any concerted
practice or category of concerted practices,
which contributes to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions
which are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in
question.
Aşağıda bir
syllibus bırakmış hoca oradan çalışabiliriz. Orada kitaplar filan var.
Bring the
treaties.
What we
discussed last week? à101 TFEU à This article design to prohibit any
undertaking to…
What was
the personal scope of this article? à 101 only concerns about
undertaking. According to union law art. 30 and 35 only state and state
institutions. It is similar with that.
It deals with the anticompetition behavior of undertaking.
How we
define undertaking? à Since article was not defined any
definition. Any entity engaged economic activity in the given market will be
considered undertaking. What is economic
activity? à We have to see whether this is it can be legal personality or it can be
single person doing economic activity.
State
undertakings fall in this undertaking definition as well as private ones. It is
not relevant for the definition of undertaking.
What is the
most important thing then? à If a foundation (vakıf) perfom
economic activity without getting any profit it falls under the definition of
undertaking.
What about
public body? à we have to see one thing, is it
performing economic activites under public law? Because the public bodies
formed under public law wouldn’t fall in the definition of undertaking. Like
police forces, emergency services is not fall in the undertakings.
The most
important element is whether they perform economic activity. Private or
profession would fall under the definition economic activity regardless finance
or statement. Like fifa and Italian Football association fall under the
definition of undertaking.
1) Personal Scope of article 101.
2) this
aspect is the material scope of
101.
Material Scope
-Agreements
-Concerted
practices
-decisions.
What can be
agreement? à Why ECJ didn’t use contract because
contract must include offer and acceptance and it must be binding. But
agreement includes contract but the other things as well like memorandums,
documents. à It is not important that is it
signed or not
According
to ECJ for an agreement to exist, it is sufficient if undertakings in question
should have express their joint intention to conduct themselves on the market
in a specific way. à It is simply saying it is not
important that it is signed or not, oral or written.
Simple
understanding, constitution of trade association, non-binding marketing rules,
gentleman agreements… are the examples of agreement under article 101.
The case
“Quinine Case” à Quinine is type of medicine for
fever. They signed a gentlemen agreement. They come together and they agreed on
to fixed the prices of 15 Euros. Then case refer to ECJ. Yes we it is correct
that we signed the agreement but it doesn’t have sanction. So parties are free
to behave how they want. But ECJ said it is not necessary is to have sanction
but it is enough that the parties express their will to behave in same way.
The other
interesting thing was the gentleman egreement was expiring in 1962 however the
case was referred in 1965 but ECJ said even the agreement expired it is irrelevant
if the parties act in the same way. They keep the prices fixed so they behave
in same way. So the agreement fell in the definition of agreement of 101.
Let’s take
that an undertaking send an chrismas card and it says we should come together
and fixed our prices. And the other party says okay let’s think about it. So
there is joint intention so that
chrismas card fall under the definition of article under article 101.
Are the
parties binding if the parties did not join the meetings actively but passively
attending the meetings? à Yes, ECJ said even they did not
express their will expressly they are
bound by the breach of 101. ECJ also said if they don’t manifest the decision
of that meeting, they are bound by the breach because they are potential effect
for that.
For example
there is an interesting case called “Roofing Felt” à There was a meeting. And some parties say we attended meeting and
knew the topic but we fear to be forced in market by the other if they don’t
attend the meeting. ECJ said your intention is not relevant for us, even you
didn’t obey the decision of that meeting you didn’t say anything to not take
any part of this decision (agreement).
Agreement
should be at least between two different undertakings. The undertakings should
be independent from each other. The legal independence is not important, they
should be independent financial as well (real independence).
If Company
X is the mother company of A and B, then A and B sign a contract with C and D,
is X responsible for the negative affect of competition market? à Yes. Because otherwise X would order to A and B to
sign the contract and could escape from the prohibition.
Next week
horizontal and vertical agreements.
The
agreements can be horizontal (producer-producer, retailer-retailer,
distributer-distributer) and vertical agreements like producer-retailer. So not
only same level of market but the undertakings could be in different level in
the market. After that we will focus on concerted practices.
Concerted
practices (uyumlu eylem)
06 Mart 2012
What was
the purpose of art. 101? à The first one was personal scope
(undertaking) à Art. 101 prohibits agreement and
concerned practices which should be concerned undertakings according to ECJ.
The second scope is the material scope. à So far we only discussed the agreements. When
we talk about agreement, we shouldn’t understand the contract in law, but any
agreement which is oral or writing or anything that they agree.
We will
discuss the decisions of undertakings and concerted practices.
It
prohibits two source of agreements. Article 101 absolueatly prohibit the
agreements between equal parties like retailer and retailer. Also article 101
also prohibit the vertical agreements like between retailer and the producer.
In Constent-Grunding
à ECJ said also vertical agreements
is fall under the art. 101 scope of agreement. Grunding signed sole
distribution ships in the France Italy
Why it is
against competition law? à How do we explain internal market? à We don’t say different markets like france market, Holland
Why the
competition rules and freemovements ruls are so connected ? à Çünkü free movement is about the restrictions
of Member States, competition rules is regulating the private parties. So the
two rules are highly connected with each other.
We will see
the concerted practices.
2. Saat
What do you
understand from the decisions of associations of undertakings? à We are not talking about trade associations
(like chamber of Istanbul
Then we
have to see decisions à What does decisions mean to us? à ECJ interpreted the decisions widely like it
did in association. Even the decisions is not binding on its members, it is
still the decisions can affect the market so these decisions is illegal under
101.
There is an
interesting case Verband v. Commmission à Verband is an association which is active in
german market. If you are an insurance company you have to register to Verband.
The associations gives recommendations to their members to increase their
premiums (prim) for insurance companies. In verband there is several commites.
And verband says this committee doesn’t have binding affect on members then it
is not against article 101. But ECJ said these kind of associations’ decisions
against 101 even they are not binding.
So ECJ interpreted the term of decisions of associations very broadly.
Overhere the court looked the potential affect of the decisions. If some
members fallow this recommendation, it is enough to be against competition law.
Concerted
Practices
It is
difficult to explain concerted practices. ECJ should be careful.
Oligopolistic
market à there are a few competitiors and a
few buyer. So they have to take the other competitors opinion before they act.
The case
Imperial Chemical Industries LTD. V Commission of the European Communites. Case
48-49 (DYESTUFFS) He showed the paragraphs 64-68 and 118. à We have a company called ICI. There are
several producers. Whenever ICI increase the prices other companies do the
same. There is no agreement between dyestuff market (painting stuffs). But
after a little search when ICI increase the prices the other do the same. So it
is kind of signal to act in parallel way.
65 BY ITS VERY NATURE,
THEN, A CONCERTED PRACTICE DOES NOT HAVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A CONTRACT BUT MAY
INTER ALIA ARISE OUT OF COORDINATION WHICH BECOMES APPARENT FROM THE BEHAVIOUR
OF THE PARTICIPANTS .
66 ALTHOUGH PARALLEL
BEHAVIOUR MAY NOT BY ITSELF BE IDENTIFIED WITH A CONCERTED PRACTICE, IT MAY
HOWEVER AMOUNT TO STRONG EVIDENCE OF SUCH A PRACTICE IF IT LEADS TO CONDITIONS
OF COMPETITION WHICH DO NOT CORRESPOND TO THE NORMAL CONDITIONS OF THE MARKET,
HAVING REGARD TO THE NATURE OF THE PRODUCTS, THE SIZE AND NUMBER OF THE
UNDERTAKINGS, AND THE VOLUME OF THE SAID MARKET .
67 THIS IS ESPECIALLY
THE CASE IF THE PARALLEL CONDUCT IS SUCH AS TO ENABLE THOSE CONCERNED TO
ATTEMPT TO STABILIZE PRICES AT A LEVEL DIFFERENT FROM THAT TO WHICH COMPETITION
WOULD HAVE LED, AND TO CONSOLIDATE ESTABLISHED POSITIONS TO THE DETRIMENT OF
EFFECTIVE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF THE PRODUCTS IN THE COMMON MARKET AND OF THE
FREEDOM OF CONSUMERS TO CHOOSE THEIR SUPPLIERS .
68 THEREFORE THE
QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS A CONCERTED ACTION IN THIS CASE CAN ONLY BE
CORRECTLY DETERMINED IF THE EVIDENCE UPON WHICH THE CONTESTED DECISION IS BASED
IS CONSIDERED, NOT IN ISOLATION, BUT AS A WHOLE, ACCOUNT BEING TAKEN OF THE
SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE MARKET IN THE PRODUCTS IN QUESTION .
ECJ firstly
give the definition of concerted practices in paragraph 64. That means “ a form of coordination between undertakings
which, without having reached the stage where an agreement properly so-called
has been concluded, knowingly substitutes practical cooperation between them
for the risks of competition.” à So there is no agreement. Their
behaviour is cannot be counted as agreement. But their behavior can be called
invisible agreement that affect the nature of competition. In paragraph 65
court says àit doesn’t have to be contract but a
kind of coordination we can understand from their behaviour. In 66 à The ECJ looked that is the increasing prices,
because of logical explanation like inflation (but it was stable while the
increasing)? But it wasn’t so ECJ asked why the other competitiors fallow the
ICI? Because if ICI increases the price why the other do the same? There is no
other reason. So they are no competitors but they are cooperating. àECJ said not every parallel conduct fall under
concerted practice, however there is no logical explanation (logical argument) why the other fallow
the ICI (since there is no changing infliation or other materials) , so their behavior
shows us they cooperate. ECJ said even it quite normal in oligopolistic market
to fallow each other, also not every parallel action is against competition
under 101; however there is no logical explanation then they cooperate with
each other instead of compete. [Even there is not an agreement, even not all
practices fall automatically under the concerted practice, if the behaviors
shows their behaviors that one of them is leading to do same thing with kind of
signal like increasing price.]
There is
another case, ECJ explains the elements of concerted practice. àEven staying in same hotel is an strong
evidence that they have a contact[Some
form of contact] For example they went the same conference and after one
week they increase the prices. They have to know what they are doing. Second
element is to do in cooperation instead
of com. Third element is they have to do so to secure, protect the positions of themselves and the others. [Hercules case]
Why a new
company is not logical explanation like in the case of Turk Telekom because
probably Turk Telekom enters in a low price to compete? The question was
preventing the new enterance not the only decrease.
Does all
the whole market behave in parallel way? Not the whole is necessary but it is
enough some of them do it.
Next week
we are going to discuss the core issue so I want you to read some cases (1)
“European Night Services [1998], (2) Consten-Grundig [1994]
13 Mart 2012
2. saat
kariyer günlerinden dolayı olmayacak.
The scope
of concerted practices is broader then the agreements.
In
DYESTUFFS case; paragraph 66 says, the parallel behaviors doesn’t automatically
fall under the scope of article 101, but it gives clear evidence for it. If the
parties cannot give logical explanation (for example market rationale) why all
those companies did the parallel behaviors. In the case the parties couldn’t do
that. So that kind of actions could be taken account for breach of article 101.
[The definition; not every parallel behavior falls under article 101 arguments
are the most important parts of case]
In Hercules
Chemicals NV v. Commission Case à ECJ laid down same essential
element to prove concerted practice;
- Some form of contact between
undertakings (it can be loose or strict e.g., meeting for a dinner)
- Some meeting of minds or
consensus
between parties to co-operate rather than compete
- The purpose should be removing
future uncertainties in the market from the risk of competition
[(1) Contact, (2)consensus to co-operate rather
then compete, (3)in order to secure their position in future in the market] à Elements of concerted practice
The contact
can be direct or indirect contact. In dyestuffs case, the leading company
publish the price list and the rest of the market fallows it. It is a contact
and meeting minds.
So far we
discuss agreement, concerted practices, and decisions of associations.
What about
the court issue? à Article 101 explains core issue. à The article is divided to part. Object and
effect.
ECJ has to
see whether the parties getting into an agreement to breach EU law ( the
intention, object these agreement or
not.) or effect to do so. à In these parts of article, firstly
We have a
case T-Mobile Netherlands BV
27 With regard to the
assessment as to whether a concerted practice is anti‑competitive, close regard
must be paid in particular to the objectives which it is intended to attain and
to its economic and legal context (see, to that effect, Joined Cases 96/82 to
102/82, 104/82, 105/82, 108/82 and 110/82 IAZ
International Belgium and Others v Commission [1983] ECR 3369, paragraph 25, and
Case C‑209/07 Beef Industry
Development Society and Barry Brothers [2008]
ECR I‑0000, paragraphs 16 and 21). Moreover, while the intention of the parties
is not an essential factor in determining whether a concerted practice is
restrictive, there is nothing to prevent the Commission of the European
Communities or the competent Community judicature from taking it into account
(see, to that effect, IAZ
International Belgium and Others v Commission, paragraphs 23 to
25).
28 As regards the
distinction to be drawn between concerted practices having an anti-competitive
object and those with anti-competitive effects, it must be borne in mind that
an anti-competitive object and anti-competitive effects constitute not
cumulative but alternative conditions in determining whether a practice falls
within the prohibition in Article 81(1) EC. It has, since the judgment in Case
56/65 LTM [1966] ECR 235, 249, been settled
case-law that the alternative nature of that requirement, indicated by the
conjunction ‘or’, means that it is necessary, first, to consider the precise
purpose of the concerted practice, in the economic context in which it is to be
pursued. Where, however, an analysis of the terms of the concerted practice
does not reveal the effect on competition to be sufficiently deleterious, its
consequences should then be considered and, for it to be caught by the
prohibition, it is necessary to find that those factors are present which
establish that competition has in fact been prevented or restricted or
distorted to an appreciable extent (see, to that effect, Beef Industry Development Society
and Barry Brothers, paragraph 15).
29 Moreover, in
deciding whether a concerted practice is prohibited by Article 81(1) EC, there
is no need to take account of its actual effects once it is apparent that its
object is to prevent, restrict or distort competition within the common market
(see, to that effect, Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/64Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299, 342; Case C‑105/04 P Nederlandse Federatieve Vereniging
voor de Groothandel op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v Commission [2006] ECR I‑8725, paragraph 125; and Beef Industry Development Society
and Barry Brothers, paragraph 16). The distinction between ‘infringements
by object’ and ‘infringements by effect’ arises from the fact that certain
forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature,
as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition (Beef
Industry Development Society and Barry Brothers, paragraph 17).
30 Accordingly,
contrary to what the referring court claims, there is no need to consider the
effects of a concerted practice where its anti‑competitive object is
established.
31 With regard to the
assessment as to whether a concerted practice, such as that at issue in the
main proceedings, pursues an anti‑competitive object, it should be noted,
first, as pointed out by the Advocate General at point 46 of her Opinion, that
in order for a concerted practice to be regarded as having an anti‑competitive
object, it is sufficient that it has the potential to have a negative impact on
competition. In other words, the concerted practice must simply be capable in
an individual case, having regard to the specific legal and economic context,
of resulting in the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within
the common market. Whether and to what extent, in fact, such anti-competitive
effects result can only be of relevance for determining the amount of any fine
and assessing any claim for damages.
If we do not understand that if there is no
actual effect (object) then we have to see that the potential effect (effect)
of the agreement or concerted practices.
(1) Parties
wanted to breach EU law (object) (2)
if they don’t then ECJ should check out the potential effect to breach. This breach can be actual or potential. But for
this the ECJ has a test in the STM case.
In a new
case; Societe Technique Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GMBH à Maschinenbau Ulm (MU) granted Societe Tecnique
Miniere (STM) the exclusive right to sell its earth-moving equipment in France
- The nature and quantity of the
products concerned à over here ECJ wanted to say,
whether effect will breach competition we must look the market share of
undertaking. If it is quite high then most likely the effect is also high.
- The position and size of the
parties concerned à in first argument we look the market
share and in this it repeats the first argument. If it is so big company
then it is most likely to effect.
- The severity of the clauses àmore severe clauses of
agreement that prevent commercial freedom of other party, most probably it
breaches the competition law.
- The possibility of other
commercial current acting on the same products by means of reimports and
re-exports. à Preventing the parallel import
or export is in general fall under the breach of competition.
These
elements are not cumulative but in general A and B should be in it.
There is
one producer and one distributor. Producer is MU and distributor is STM. But
unlike grundin case, there was not prevention for parallel importation and
exportation.
If there is
an actual effect (object) and it is quite clear then it automatically falls
under article 101. But if it is not we do not fallow the elements of the case
in STM case for the effect.
[Yani
izlediğimiz yol şu: Öncelikle agreement var mı yok mu, concerted practice var
mı yok mu diye bakıyoruz. Ondan sonra eğer eğer
20 Mart 2012
We are
going to talk about “de miniminis” principle. à European competition law and Turkish
competition law has this principle.
We discussed
last week; once we determine there is an agreement or concerted practices in
the sense of article 101, then we should see these agreements or concerted
practices are allowed.
If it is
quite clear that the parties want to intent (object) to infringing the
competition. Then it is a clear shot. Then ECJ say we don’t need to test the
effect. However if the object of the agreement is not clear then court check out something else (clear
economic analysis). These two things are not cumulative, they are alternative
to each other.
How do we
get if the object is not quite clear. Then in order to understand that the
effect is anti-competitive or not. Then we have to exemine a number of factors:
Geçen hafta A, B, C, D leri anlattı hoca tekrar.
What we see
up to now à Agreement, undertaking, concerted
practices, decisions of associations. (The scope) And then we need to examine
is that their intention (object or effect) infringe the competition rules.
De Miniminis Principle
This is an
old doctrine ECJ decided on it. The first case about this was Völk – Vervaeche
Case. à Völk is producer company. Vervaeche
is a distributer. They have an exclusive distributor agreement. In dutch market
völk gives the promise the sole distributorship to vervaeche. So this case is
very similar to constin and grundin. à Even the agreement between parties
automatically fall in the scope of article 101, but their effect is too small
because their market share is really low. Then the effect is not really
noticeable effect to competition market.
“The notice
2001/C 368/07 Paragraph 1 we read this:
1. Article 81(1) prohibits agreements between
undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
within the common market. The Court of Justice of the European Communities has
clarified that this provision is not applicable where the impact of the
agreement on intra- Community trade or on competition is not appreciable. à If the effect is not appreciable , therefore
these kind of agreements might escape from the prevention under the article
101.
Then we
read the paragraph 7 à ECJ gives some thresholds. In (a)
is their aggregate (combinied) market share exceed %10 percent on the relevant
markets. If it is so then article 101 is not applicable. (Horizontal
agreement-agreements between competitors) à In (b), if the agreement took place vertical
level, therefore the trashhold increase to %15. Whether their combined share of
parties exceed %15 percent.(vertical agreement between non-competitors) [This
is principle so there is an exception in paragraph 11 (3 exceptions) à So de minimis principle is exception to the
article 101 but there is an exception to principle in 3 hardcore restrictions.]
This was the first application of de minimis rule.
Commission
Notice on agreement of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict
competition under article [101](1) of the Treaty establishing the European
Community (de minimis)
1. Article [101] (1) prohibits agreements between undertakings which may
affect trade between Mamber States and which have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortions of competition within the common market.
The Court of Justice of the European [Union] has clarified that this provision
is not applicable where the impact of the agreement on intra-[Union ]
trade or on competition is not appreciable.
7. The
Commission holds the view that agreements between undertakings which affect
trade between Member States do not appreciably restrict competition within the
meaning of article 101(1):
(a) if the
aggregate market share held by the parties to the agreement does not exceed 10
% on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement, where the agreement
is made between undertakings which are actual or potential competitors on any
of these markets (agreements between competitors) ; or
(b) if the
market share held by each of the parties to the agreement does not exceed 15 %
on any of the relevant markets affected by the agreement, where the agreement
is made between undertakings which are not actual or potential competitors on
any of these markets (agreements between
non-competitors).
11. Points
7, 8 and 9 do not apply to agreements containing any of the following hardcore restrictions:
(1) as
regards agreements between competitors as defined in point 7, restrictions
which, directly or indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other
factors under the control of the parties, have as their object (3):
(a) the
fixing of prices when selling the products to third parties;
(b) the
limitation of output or sales;
(c) the
allocation of markets or customers;
ECJ’in
Völk’den sonra yaptığı uygulamalarda hep farklı oranlar olduğundan
commission’un verdiği bir yeknesaklaştırma notice’dir.
Vize Sonrası
10 Nisan 2012
We are
answering exam question. It is important because you will be responsible for
these topics for the final exam.
1) The
legal form, how it is established is irrelevant. According to ECJ any entity
which has economic activity is “undertaking” according to article 101.
2) In order
to apply article 101 there should be at least two legally independent
undertakings. However there is one more issue. In our case, there are two legal
separated undertakings but we have to look financial independence as well. But
one undertaking is giving its profit to another; therefore there is no
financially independence. Therefore we will not apply article 101.
3) So far
we discussed personal scope of article 101. Now we will discuss material scope.
Here we have a recommendation. Therefore this recommendation falls under
article 101. Associations’ recommendations are fall under the article 101. Because ECJ interpreted it broadly.
4) The
other parties didn’t say anything. So there is no meeting of mind. So there is
no agreement. There is a concerted practice. In the second part of question,
there is the doctrine but there was a limit for the market share. It was 10%.
We have only 5%. However, there were 3 exceptions. Fixing the price was one of
the exceptions. So therefore the case might fall under the article 101.
We will
give a 10 minutes break. After that we will start today’s topic which is
exemptions of article 101.
2. Saat
Slayt
Art. 101 (3) TFEU:
Exemptions
Art. 101(1) TFEU: scope of article and prohibition
Not within scope: De minimis doctrine
Article 101(3) TFEU: within scope of article but exempted
-individual exemption: 4 cumulative conditions
Efficiency gain
Consumers receive a fair share of
the efficiency gain
Indispensable
No elimination of competition on
relevant market
-block exemptions:
vertical restrains: if supply/demand side has less than 30% market share
Horizontal
agreements: R&D and specialization
No exemption applies: Art. 101(2) TFEU: agreement void ex tunc/fine issued by court
or competition authority (national or EU level)
Efficiency
gain: improvement of production, distribution. Or a great benefit for the
economy, service in the market.
It is not
enough to prove efficiency gain; they must show that consumers get a share from
the market. For example we have a case “CECED.” That was an agreement for the
wash machines. Two producers agreed on for the not produce class d and e.
meaning that the won’t produce machines that use too much electricity. There is
a horizontal agreement between undertakings. And this fall under 101. And they
decided to not produce certain products. So they tried to show that 4 criteria.
But D and E class machines are cheaper then the A, B, C class machines. So consumers
does not gain fair share. But ECJ said in long term less using electricity
There is
another case “Clima Chappe/Buderus” à Concept is the same. It is a
horizontal agreement. They both produce ventilator system and air conditioner
systems. But chappe and buderus agreed on not to produce both of them and said
chappe produce only air conditions and buderus produce only ventilators. à Their aim is to become expert on the producing
products. And they will improve the technology for the products. So there is an
efficiency gain. But is there any fair share for consumers? à Yes because they become expert. And they
produce good quality products. Maybe little bit high price but they get other
benefits. (hocanın örneği şu; şimdi 1000 liraya 5 yıl giden bir makina var, ama
1500 liraya 10 yıl giden makina üretebilmeye başladıklarında long term’de
concumers also gets fairy share)
Another
case is ACEC à ACEC produce electricity
transmission for the buses. Sonra bir bus firması geliyor ve ACEC’e diyor ki
bize bir tane transmission üret ve bunu sadece senden alalım sen de kimseye
satma. Yani bu güzel teknolojiyi kullanalım diyor. Yani sonuç olarak şöyle bir
şey var: ACEC bunu üreterek markete gelişmiş bir ürün koyacak. Yani teknolojik
bir gelişme var. Tüketiclerde yararlanacak. But ECJ said yes there is an efficiency gain for
market and fair share for the consumers but is that indispensable
(proportionate) agreement. Because they were prohibiting parallel importation
so it is not proportionate. This agreement is not necessary to come this
efficiency gain.
And also
the agreement affects certain amount of competition but the agreement shouldn’t
totally eliminate (effect) the competition in the market. (Abolish competition
from the market)
Şimdi
normalde bir anlaşma veya concerted practice var ve de bu deminimise girmiyor.
Yani article 101’ın alanına giren bir şey var. Yani infringement var. Ama 3.
fıkra bize şöyle bir şans veriyor. 4 tane kriteri tam olarak karşılarsa o
zaman, bu kısıtlamalardan yani ihlalden kurtuluyorlar. Yani bunun sonucu olan
cezalardan filan da kurtulmuş oluyorlar kısaca. Ama 4 şartın da birlikte
gerçekleşmesi lazım unutmayın.
We
discussed individual exemption, now we go on with the block exemption: à After 2003 undertakings does not obliged to
notify the commission with the agreement. But this freedom gives undertakings a
burden on their shoulder (it is a risky thing). They have to criticize the 4
criteria. à To reduce this risk commissions
releases a notification (notice) and as long as the agreements between parties
fulfill the certain criteria in the notice then the agreement is exempted. So
they will able to escape from the prohibition of article 101.
So we check
first article 101, then de minimis, then block exemption, then we go to
individual exemption.
What is the
block exemption? à There is vertical restraint and
horizontal restraint. à For the vertical agreement, if the
market share is less then 30% then there is a block exemption. Not the total
share is %30; the separate shares shouldn’t be more then 30%. For the exemption
regulation says this. But like de minimis we have a black list again. If the
agreement is about “fixing price” and “dividing market” then it doesn’t matter
that the share is less then %30. They can’t use the block exemption.
For
horizontal agreements (between competitors) à if it is specialization agreement(1) and if it
is research and development agreement (R and D)(2) and also if the agreement
technology transfer agreement(3) à If the agreements is one of the
three agreement, then we should check out the market shares of total share of
the markets should be %20 for the specialization agreement and technology
transfer agreement; and should be %25 for the R and D agreement. à so;
-specialization
agreement (20%)
-research
and development (R and D) (25%)
-technology
transfer agreement (20%)
But if
there is fixing price and dividing market then we do not care about the shares
again like the vertical block exemption.
17 Nisan 2012
Slayt
Article 102
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a
dominant position within the internal market or in a substantial part of it
shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal market in so far as it
may affect trade between Member States. Such as abuse may, in particular
consist in:
(a)………..
Article 101 TFEU: agreements between two or
more undertakings
Article 102 TFEU: behaviorof one or more
undertakings
Compenents of Article 102: 1. Undertaking
2. Dominant position
3. Abuse of that position
4. Abuse affects trade between MSs.
1. Undertaking
*Same definition as ‘undertaking’ under article
101 TFEU. Covers also more than one undertaking within the same corporate or
economic group when cooperation between parent companies and their subsidiaries
is very close (Continental Case, case 6/72)
*Joint dominance
2. Dominance
* A position of economic strength enjoyed
by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective competition being
maintained on the relevant market by giving it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers, and
ultimately of its consumers’ (United brands, case 27/76).
2. Slayt
Relevant Market
-Relevant product market: is the market
for the product(s) that are substantially interchangeable (Hugin Kassaregister,
case 22/78)
-Relevant geographical market: Article
102: the undertaking is dominant within the common market ‘or in a substantial
part of it’.
Dominance in Fact
-Market share
-Barriers to entry.
Abuse
Dominance on a market in itself is not
punishable under Article 102 TFEU.
Art. 102 gives four examples of abuse that are
prohibited, however the list in art. 102 is not exhaustive.
Abuse can be divided in exploitative abuse and
anticompetitive abuses.
*Exploitative abuses, imposing oppressive of
unfair conditions on trading partners.
-unfair prices
-unfair trading conditions.
-discriminatory treatments.
We are
starting 102. This time we are talking
about an undertaking which can be in dominant position. Article 102 prohibits
abuse of the dominant position.
Almost all
of you made a mistake in exam. In the question of undertaking,
What is
dominant position? à We have to see as a undertaking has
a power to give its own decision without thinking customers or other
competitors. But it doesn’t mean this is monopoly. In monopoly there is only
one supplier. Every monopoly has a dominant position. But not every dominant
company is monopolistic undertaking. Not every leading company has dominant
position. Because in some markets
leading companies are not in the dominant position.
What is the
personal scope of 102? à what is undertaking in article 102?
à It is same with the article 101. So
same things are applicable with 102.
In continental can case à Continental can is owner of euro ambalaj. And
a German Can producer. In this case, Euro Ambalaj hollandalı bir can
üreticisini almak istiyor. Ama burada Continental Almanya’da %85’e yakın payı
var. Hollandadakini alırken de euro ambalajın payı da %45’e yakın olyor. Böyle
olunca genel payı çok yüksek oluyor continental’ın. Dolayısıyla personal
scope’da ana şirketin payını da hesaba katmamız gerekiyor.
Dominance
Hakim
pozisyonda mı değil mi diye anlamamız için kesinlikle ilgili market nedir onu
belirlememiz gerekiyor. O yüzden çok önemli birazdan anlatılacak olanlar.
What is the
relevant market? à Relevant market has two aspects.
First, relevant product market and second, relevant geographical market.
SSNIP test à If we increase the price of one
product, then if the consumers automatically switch the other product then it
is one single market. Like the example of beer and wine market. Yani bakılan
şey şu, birinin fiyatı arttırılınca tüketiciler başka bir şeye geçiyorsa o
geçilen başka şey de markete dahil ediliyor.
Here we
have to see the consumer. But ECJ check something else. Not only consumer but
also producer and its supplier. In example of buğday unu vermeyen uncuların
karşısında ekmekçinin buğday unu yerine mısır unu almaya başlaması örneği.
United
Brands à Çikita muz örneği. Bu firma bir takım firmalara satmayı reddetti
muzu. Dolayısıyla hakim pozisyonda mı değil mi diye bakmamız gerekti. ECJ’de Taze
meyve sebze marketi değil de sadece muz sektörü relevant market olmalıdır dedi.
Çünkü tadı farklı, işte yumuşak olduğundan bebeler de yiyo. O yüzden diğer
meyvelerle aynı market içinde değerlendirilemez diyor. Sadece muz marketi
olmalıdır diyor.
Hugin
Cashmachine case à Cashmachine spear parts, yazar kasa
yedek parçalarını üretiyor. Ama onları sunmaktan kaçınıyor. ECJ’de diyor ki
senin reddettiğin şey yazarkasa marketinde değil Hugin’in yazarkasa yedek
parçasıdır diyor. Yani çok geniş yorumluyor.
Relevant Geographical Market
Mesela
ekmek marketini Istanbul
We have to
look at the consumers. Are they willing to buy bread from other places? They do
not. So the market is Istanbul Bread
Market not the Turkish Bread Market. Other example is yumurta örneği. Mesela
ben yumurta üreticisiyim. Istanbul’da bir kaç süpermarkete yumurta satmıyorum.
If the
consumers willing to switch some other places.
However we
have to look at content of the product as well. Bread is not easily
transported. There is a case called ‘hilty case’. Stapler is easily
transported. So consumers can buy staplers from somewhere else. So consumers
have more choice to buy from diffirent places. Hilty is only dominant in German
market. But not in whole EU market. ECJ
said we should consider stapler’s market as EU market. Therefore refusing the
supply does not infringe the article 102.
Cross Elasticity??* à???
İlk başta
alakalı ürün marketinde dominant position’da mı diye bakacağız ondan sonra da
alakalı coğrafi markette’de dominant position’da mı diye bakacağız. Bunun için
de relevant product market’in ne olduğunu sonra da relevant geographical market
ne diye bakmamız lazım. Bunun için de SSNIP test’i uyguluyor ECJ. Yani şuna
bakıyor, tüketiciler, müşteriler başka bir ürüne ya da başka bir coğrafi alana
gidiyorlar mı diye bakmamız lazım. Bundan sonra da company cidden dominant
pozisyonda mı diye bakmamız lazımdır.
Dominance in Fact
Greater
marketshare is a good indicator for a good dominant position. If the market
share is more than %50 then we can say that it is clear that the company is
dominant. But company can prove that they don’t have power to behave independently
from the competitors, consumers… Then they are not a dominant company. But in
general if they have %50+ share then it is dominant company.
For
example, in the cheap car market in EU, X company has %55 share. It is clear
that it is dominant company. But if X company can prove that I have to take
care other competitors (severe competition) or consumers meaning that they
cannot behave independently from these things then it can’t be taken account as
dominant company. For this we have to look at the other companies marketshares.
If the marketshares are quite small, then the X wouldn’t fear from the other
competitors. (Yani ilk başta market payına bakacağız ama bu yetmiyor diğer
şirketlerin de market payına bakacağız. Eğer
Şimdi
sadece market share önemli değil. Mesela bir vitamin üreticisi var. Adamın payı
%30 civarında. Ama çok kaliteli ürettiği için diğerleri yarışamıyor bununla. O
yüzden de diğerlerini önemsemiyor. Yani kısaca hakim poziyonda olma gücünü
başka şeylerde verebilirler. İşte birisi quality’dir. Bir başkası ise
brand’dir. Bir diğeri ise technology’dir. (google example) Yani bunlar bir
aktöre (actor) yeterli gücü verebilirler. After sale services bile bir
belirleyici olabilir.
Secondly we
have to look at Length of time during which a firm has held its position in the
relevant product market. ECJ says that dominant position should be at least 5
years in that dominant position.
Thirdly we
have to look at other barriers to entry to market. If there is a high entry
barriers, then there is no future competition. Then lower share entities can be
in dominant position.
If the
answers are yes to this 3 thins then the company is in the dominant position.
But article 102 does not prohibit the dominant position (not like US
Next week
we are going to discuss dominant position.
24 Nisan 2012
Being in a
dominant position is not prohibited –unlike us system-. Becoming dominant
position is not a bad thing. But what is punishable is the abuse of the
dominant position.
Slayt
Article 102 TFEU:
Abuse
- Dominance in itself is not punishable: Michelin(1983): “ a finding that an
undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination but simply
means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a dominant position, the undertaking
concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair
genuine undistorted competition on the common market.”
- Abuse is crucial for article 102 TFEU. Definition
of abuse: Hoffmann – La roche
(1979): “ the concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behavior
of an undertaking in dominant position… which, by using methods different from
those which condition normal competition…, has the effect of hindering the
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market.
Slayt
Explotative and
anti-competitive abuse
Exploitative abuse: dominant undertaking uses
its position to impose unfair conditions on its trading partners
A.Unfair pricess: price bears no relation to the
economic value of the product. Is the price higher than what would have been
the case if the market were competitive?
B.Unfair trading
conditions:
C.Discrimnatory
treatment: undertaking
cannot give an objective justification for the difference in treatment of
trading partners
D.Refusal to supply
Exploitative abuse
The list
provided by the treaty is not exhausted. For both abuses, it is not necessary
to get -benefit economical or other – benefit is irrelevant for abuse of
dominant position.
World Cup Case à Bir tane şirket var. Bunlar 1998
dünya kupasının biletlerini dağıtıyorlar. Sonra diyorlar ki sadece Fransa da
posta kutusu bulunanlara bu biletleri vereceğiz diyor. İşte sonra bu abuse of
dominant position olur mu diyorlar. ECJ ilk başta personal scope’a bakıyor. Ve
bu personal scope’taki undertaking’dir diyor. Ama sonra diyor ki, bun naısl bir
market diyor. Yani spor bileti mi, futbol bileti mi yoksa dünya kupası bileti
mi diyor. Yani relevant market’e bakıyor. İlk başta futbol tüm diğer sporlardan
farklıdır diyorlar. Sonra da dünya kupası kıyaslanmayacak kadar farklıdır
futbolun diğer yarışmalarından diyorlar. Yani relevant market dünya kupasıdır
dolayısıyla da bu şirket dominant position’dadır diyorlar. ECJ then decided on
the geographical relevant market. Sonra diyorlar ki biz hiç benefit almadık
diyor bu kuraldan. ECJ’de de diyor ki, getting benefit is not important to. The
important thing is abuse of the dominant position.
So we
learned two important things. First of all not only competitors use the article
102 for protection, but also customers and trading partners article 102.
Secondly getting profit or benefit is not important.
Unfair Prices
If the
price does not have any relation with its economic value then it is an unfair
price. But it is really hard to define the actual economic value such products.
Like books, Ferrari. United Brand Case, UB increase the prices of very
high. UB is in a dominant position. Normal muz fiyatlarına göre çok yüksek
fiyatları var diyorlar. Ama UB diyor ki biz muz üretiyoruz ama normal muz değil
çikita muz diyor. O yüzden fiyat yüksek olabilir diyor. Kalite farkı var diyor.
Yani fiyat farkı olması normal diyor. Burada dominant position var ama abuse
yoktur.
2. Saat
Exploitative
abuses are against trading partners, anti-competitive abuse is against
competition. That is the why ECJ make a distinction. In general exploitative
abuse is about vertical relations, anti-competitive abuse is about horizontal.
Unfair Trading Condition
United
Brand is again says that distributors have to have some ripening facilities to
make green bananas to yellow ones. Because they said we need to send the
bananas in yellow. But ECJ said it is
not necessary to sell the product. Because supermarkets or consumers can make
this process with putting the bananas under the sun for a few hours. So it is
not necessary to sell your goods. So you cannot put this kind of conditions. But
even they have ripining facilities, to asking as a condition is abuse of
dominant position.
Discriminatory Treatment
UB sells
bananas to different EU countries but in different prices. EU asked the UB why
they are doing so? And they said some countries have poor people so we charge
less but some have rich ones so we charge more. It is not a valid argument.
Because in similar transactions you cannot discriminate the buyers.
Refusal to supply
If you are
in a dominant position, then you don’t have the luxury to refuse the supply.
Commercial Solvent Case à CSC produces X and Y which are row materials
for Z. and Z is used for the cure for tuberculoses. CSC produces X and Y. we
have another company ICI (middle man) that buys X and Y and sell to the producers
of Z producers called ZOJA. %51 of ICI is belong to CSC. Then ICI wanted to buy
ZOJA. But something goes wrong and ZOJA refuses the agreement. Then ICI decided
not to sell X and Y to ZOJA. ZOJA tried to buy X and Y from different
companies. But because CSC and ICI said other actors of markets not to sell X
and Y to ZOJA. ECJ asked why you are doing this? And they said we will produce
Z as well and row materials are only enough for us. ECJ said we are not facing
only exploitative abuse but also anti-competitive abuse. By using their
dominance they want to be dominant in another market as well. So it is pushing
out the market actors. Then it is a huge abuse.
Refusal to
supply is very important for EU law.
08 May 2012
Explotative
abuse happens between trading partners. Dominant undertaking and the downstreet
market (so vertical relations)Unfair prices, unfair trading conditions,
discriminatory treatment, refusal to supply.
We are
going to cover anti-competitive abuse. Between dominant undertaking and its
competitors.
Anti-Competitive
abuse: undertaking
or eliminating competitiors to increase its own dominance
A. Tying:
An undertaking
·
Supplies
a product (the tying product) on condition that the customer obtains something
else (the tied product) from the supplier as well [Microsoft]
·
or
provides them cheaper if he does [Hoffman La roche];
·
or
the undertaking only supplies the two things together
·
or
ensures that the two things only work properly together and do not work at all or as well with
competitors’ product.
B. Predatory pricing: it is the practice whereby an
undertaking prices its product so low that competitors cannot live with the
price and are driven from the market. Once the competitors are excluded from
the market the undertaking hopes to increase prices to monopoly levels and
recoup its losses.
- It is anticompetitive because it means low
prices in the short term, but the effects are to strengthen the power of
the dominant undertaking to the prejudice of consumers.
- This strategy is possible only if there is
serious barriers to entry
The AKZO test (1991) Prices below average variable cost
(AVC) must be regarded as abusive, because there is no profit-maximizing reason
for them. The only explanation is that they are intended to eliminate competitors.
C. Refusal to supply
Tying in is
kind of forcing the customers to buy the second product with the main product.
Microsoft case buying windows with media player.
Hoffman La
roche is the dominat in the vitamin market. Undertaking says to the pharmacies
that if they buy other products they will get discount. So there is a special
clause that includes discount. The another issue is this contract includes
English Clause (if you see that my competitors can provide same product cheaper
then I do, then you have to let me know to drop my prices as well). Even this
is very beneficial for the consumers, Hoffman has a chance to know whole market
strategy and they will be able to kick out the other competitors from the
market.
Tying in’le
ilgili bir soru gelebilir. Eğer
Predatory
prices (yıkıcı fiyatlandırma) à Dominant firms are able to live
longer than other firms with selling products under cost prices. The dominant
firm should prove (burden of proof is on the dominant firm) their main
intention is not kicking out from the market. Otherwise they will be infringing
the
Akzo case à ECS is a british company, akzo is dutch
company. They are competitors. They are both producers. They both produce
peroxide and this used in flower and plastics. Akzo is producing flower and
plastics as well but unlike akzo is only producing peroxide. Akzo sonradan
kendi ürettiği peroxide ile flower and plastics üretmeye başlıyor. Sonra
bakıyor ki ECS kendi tüketicilerini çalıyor. Bunun üzerine gidip ECS ile
konuşuyor diyor ki plastic market’ten çekil. Onlar da yok yaa avcumu yala
diyorlar. Karşı taraf da görürsün olm sen bittin deyip çekip gidiyorlar. AKZO
büyük bir şirket. BUnlar da fiyatları çılgın gibi düşürüyorlar. SOnra ECS işte
comission’a gidiyor, commission da ECJ’e gönderiyor. Sonra ECJ bunların fiyatı
düşürmesinin sebebi neydi diye bakıyorlar. Konuşmadan anlıyorlar ki bu normal
bir fiyat düşürme değil, ECS’I marketten silmek için yapılan bir fiyat düşürme.
Yani Predatory pricing yapıyorlar.
Refusal to
supply à We discussed this in the exploitative
abuse but this can also be anti-competitive abuse. We see again CSC case à addition to what we discussed earlier; CSC
decided to produce product Z for themselves. So CSC becomes competitors to
ZOJA. So this is also anti competitive abuse addition to exploitative abuse.
2. Saat
ESSENTIAL FACILITES
DOCTRINE
·
The
doctrine concerns undertaking which own or control a facility that is necessary
to carry out a particular type of business, but which could not particularly be
reproduced by a competing entity or a potential competitor.
·
The
commission notice on access agreements in the telecommunication sector ([1988]
OJ C265/3);
“a
facility or infrastructure which is essential for reaching costumers and/or for
enabling a competitor to carry on business, and which cannot be replicated by
any reasonable means.”
Factors are
required for a refusal of access to constitute an abuse
·
Refusal
likely to eliminate all competition in the downstream market from the person
requiring access
·
Refusal
incapable of objective justification
·
Access must be indispensable for the other person for
carrying on its business
·
No
actual or potential substitute for it
Rodby Havn Caseà A port in Denmark Germany
If the
facility is essential then the facility have to open its facilities to
competitors
Bronner
case à A newspaper in Austria
Examples
for essential facilities:
Sector
|
Activities which are usually non-competitive
|
Activities which are potentially competitive
(down stream markets)
|
Railways
|
Track and
signaling infrastructure;
|
Operating
of trains, maintenance facilities
|
Electricity
|
High-voltage
transmission of electricity, Local electricity distribution
|
Electricity
generation, Electricity “retailing” or “marketing” activities.
|
Telecommunication
|
The
provision of a ubiquitions network, Local residential telephony in rural
areas
|
Long-distance
services, Mobile services
|
Gas
|
High-pressure
transmission of gas, Local gas distribution
|
Gas
production, Gas storage.
Gas
“retailing” and “marketing” activities
|
Air
services
|
Airport
services such as take-off and landing slots
|
Aircraft
operations, Maintenance facilities, Catering services
|
Next week
we will cover the merger doctrine. Which is kind of merging of companies.
Becoming dominant position with own resources is not forbidden but
buying/merging is kind of different. Article 102 is about abuse of dominant
position. We will see next week.
15 May 2012
Bugünkü konumuz birleşmeler ve devralmalar. Madde 101’I
tartıştık. Neydi? à İki yada daha fazla kişinin rekabete etkileyici davranışlarıdır. 102 ise hakim
durumdaki teşebbüslerin rekabete etkileyen davranışlarıdır. Hâkim durumunu
kötüye kullanırsa 102’nin alanına giriyor.
Bugünkü konumuz ise konsantrasyonların denetlenmesidir. Yani
birleşme veya devralmaların denetlenmesi. Özellikle horizontal olanlar çok
önemli. Sıkıntı şudur: acaba böyle bir güç birleşimi rekabeti nasıl
etkileyecek. Çünkü rakipler birleşiyor. Yani rekabet azalıyor. Özellikle
oligopolistic pazarlarda çok önemlidir bunlarda. Tekel durumuna gelme riski
vardır. Yani birleşme veya devralmalar da 101, 102 kadar önemlidir. Ama bunları
denetleyecek kanun maddesi yoktur. 101, 102 zarar verici eylem ortaya çıktıktan
sonra uygulanan eylemlerdir. Ama biz şunu yapalım dediler. Acaba iki şirket
birleşecekse yani zarar verici eylem meydana gelmeden once biz buna müdahale
edelim diyorlar. 1989’da avrupa komisyonu bir regulasyon çıkardı. Bunu 2004’te değiştirdi.
Bunun amacı bir şirket birleşecek ya da devralınacaksa, bu rekabeti etkileyecek
mi etkilemeyecek mi diye komisyona bildir diyor. Böylece ben de seni denetleyim
diyor. Dolayısıyla bbizim tartışacağımız konu konsantrasyon nedir? Ve de
regulasyonun bu konsantrasyonlara karşı aldığı önlemler nelerdir?
Birleşmelerin olumlu bir yanı da var. Mesela küçük
firmaların etkinliği, sermaye, know-howlar artacak. Global düzeyde rekabet
edebilecek firmalar haline gelecektir. İkinci bir durumsa, eğer birleşme ve
devralma tamamen yasaklansaydı hiç bir firma kurulmak istemeyecekti çünkü kurulurken
çekilmek istersem ben bu firmayı ne yapacaktım diyecektir. Ayrıca iflas
durumundaki yani batık durumdaki firmalar kendini kapatmak zorunda kalacaktı,
dolayısıyla bu da insanları işsiz kalmasına sağlayacaktır. Yani bu yüzden
tamamen engellenmiyor berileşme ve devralmalar. Bu yüzden rekabet otoriteleri
doğru dengeyi bulması gerekiyor.
Birleşme ve devralma nedir? Genel adı konsantrasyonlar.
Bunun için iki şeye bakmak lazımdır. Biri konsantrasyon var mıdır? Ayrıca
avrupa birliği diemantion’I var mıdır diye bakmamamız lazım. Bu iki şeye
bakacaksınız.
Merger yani birleşme nedir? à İki veya daha fazla
firmanın bir araya gelerek başka bir şirket oluşturmasıdır. A B C firması bir
araya geliyor ve D firmasını kuruyorlar. Bu tipik bir birleşmedir. (şirket
evlilikleri.)
Konsantrasyonda başka bir şey ise, acquisition yani satın
alma: A firması B ve C firmasını satın alıyor. Burada önemli olan şudur: Acaba
şirketin tamamı mı yoska bir kısmını alma da konsantrasyon olur mu? à
Komisyonun cevabı şudur: B ve C teşebbüsleri kontrolü tamamen A teşebbüsüne
bıraktı mı bıraktı mı diye bakmak lazımdır. MEsela %51 hissesini aldı. O zaman
olur. Peki %49? à
Küçük hissedarlar karşısında duramayacağından
Bir de joint venture var. A firması B firması ile bir araya
gelip C firmasının kontrolünü ele alıyor. Bunun diğerlerinden farkı ise şudur.
A ve B firmaları tek başına control edembiyorlar C’yi bunların C yi control
etmesi için birlikte olması gerekiyor.
Bu üç durumdan biri gerçekleştiyse konsantrasyon var
diyebiliriz. Yani bu material scope varsa concantrasyon vardır diyebiliriz.
Bir de eu dimention diye bir şey var. Yani regulasyonun
içinde treshhold dediğimiz sınırlar var. Bu sınırlar gerçekleşince komisyondan
izin almak zorundadır. Eğer bu sınırlar sağlanmamışsa komisyonun söz sahibi
olması imkansızdır. Bu durumda artık
yerel otoritelerin kontrolü ele alması vardır.
Burada bakmamız gereken Pazar payı vardır. Yani yıllık
cirolarıyla ilgili bir takım kriterler var. İlk kriter şudur; iki tarz kriter
var. Ordan önceki kısım sağlanırsa onay vermeye komisyon yetkilidir demektir.
Söz konusu birleşmeden sonra söz konusu firmaların dünya çapındaki ciroları
toplam 5 milyar euro’nun üzreinde mi değil midir buna bakmamız lazımdır. Eğer
fazlaysa bunlardan en az ikisinin EU çapındaki ciroları 250 milon EURO’nun
üzerinde mi değil mi diye bakmamız gerekiyor. Yani dünya çapında hepsinin 5
milyar euro mu, sonra da organizasyonu kuran teşebbüslerin en az ikisinin
toplam cirosu 250 milyon euro’yu geçiyor mu geçmiyor mu diye bakıyoruz. Bu
kriterler olmazsa artık yerel otoriteler yetkilidir. Ama bu threshold lar
aşılırsa artık avrupa komisyonu yetkilidir bu consantrasyonlarda.
İkinci kirter var bir de. Yani birinci kriterler olmazsa
ikinci kriter şuna bak diyor (ordan sonraki kısım) Yine böyle bir birleşmede bu
yeni firmanın toplam cirosu 2.5 milyarın üstünde midir değil midir diyor? Ondan
sonra da söz konusu birleşmeye sebep vermin şirketlerin en az ikisinin avrupa birliği
içindeki toplam ciroları 100 milyon euro’nun üzerinde mi değil mi diyor. Bir de
üçüncü kritere bak diyor. O da şu: acaba
3 tane avrupa birliği ülkesinden mi geliyor bu şirketlerin 100 milyon eurosu.
Bu adamların cirolarının 100 milyonluk kısmı 3 tane aynı avrupa birliği üyesi
devletten gelmesi gerekiyor. Mesela D E F birleşip Y’Yi oluşturuyor. D’nin 150
bin E’nin 120 bin F’nin 80 bin euroluk geliri avrupadan. Şimdi bunların toplam
100 milyonu aynı üye 3 ülkeden gelecek. Eğer bu kriterler varsa ilk kriter
olmasa bile yine komisyon yetkilidir rekabet otoritesi olarak.
Diğelim ki bu kriterlerin hepsi sağlandı. Bir de istisnamız
var. O da son paragraftan geliyor. Şimdi A(350) B(300) ve C (200) firmalarının
dünya çapındaki toplam cirosu 6 milyar € geliri var. İkinci kriter olarak 250
milyar €’yu da geçiyor. Yani en az ikisinin toplamı 250 milyon €’u geçiyor. Ama
istisisna şunu söylüyor eğer söz konusu teşebbüsler avrupadaki toplam cirosunun
2/3’ünü tek bir devletten mi geliyor diye bakmamız gerekiyor. Eğer 3’ününde
yani A’nın ki 240 B’nin ki 200 C’nin 140’I almanya’dan geliyorsa Artık
regulasyon uygulanmıyor. Çünkü diyor ki o zaman artık git almanya rekabet
otoritesi baksın sana ben komisyon değil diyor.
Söz konusu kriterler açıldığı zaman otomatikman komisyonun kapsamında değildir.
Söz konusu bariyer aşıldığında otomatikman yasak kapsamında değildir. Bariyeri
aşınca karar verecek otorite komisyondur. O zaman komisyon izin mi verecek
yoksa yasak mı koyacak buna karar verecektir. KOmisyon böyle bir birleşme veya
devralma rekabet üzreinde olumsuz bir etki oluştaracak mı oluşturmayacak mı
bakmamız gerekiyor.
Bir konsantrasyonun yasaklanması için hâkim duruma gelen
firma rekabeti azaltacak mı azaltmayacak mı bakmamız lazımdır. 102’de ne dedik?
à
Hâkim duruma gelmek yasak değildir ama bunu sadece kendi imkânlarıyla yapması
lazımdır. Ama hâkim durumun kötüye kullanılması yasaktır. Burada iki görüş var:
Şimdi bir görüş diyor ki kendi olanaklarıyla (yılmaz aslant) geliyorsa yasak
kapsamında değildir ama birleşerek devralarak oluyorsa tartışılmadan yasak
kapsamına alınmalıdır. Ama diğer görüş diyor ki, hayır madde 102’deki gibi
(Pelin Güven) hakim duruma gelmek önemli bir kriterdir ama tek başına yeterli
değildir ahkim durumun ileriye dönük olarak kötüye kullanılabilir mi
kullanılamaz mı diye bakıp ondan sonra yasak kapsamına sokmak gerekir diyor.
Komisyon da Pelin Güven’in görüşünde.
Bunu yaparken komisyonun yaptığı şey; bir testi uygulyor.
Birincisi pazarın durumuna bakmak gerekiyor. Rekabetçi bir Pazar mı yoksa
oligopolistic bir Pazar mı diye bakıyor. Çünkü az sayıda teşebbüs varsa bunları
nbirleşmesi de pazarı etkileyecektir. İkinci olarak bu birleşme sonucunda elde
edilen Pazar payı nedir diye bakmak gerekiyor. Yani mesela %50 ‘den falza değil
de %90’I filan diyor. Yani pazarın yapısı ve sonra diğer aktörlerin yapısına
baker. Bunlar çok spesifik kriterler değil, her olayda bakılması gerekiyor.
Birleşme ve devralmada komisyonun yapması gereken şudur; acaba birleşme ve
devralmada bunlar rekabeti etkiliyor mu.
Sadece madde 101 ve 102 rekabeti sağlamak konusunda yeterli
değil. Ayrıca birleşme ve devralma rekabeti etkiliyor mu diye bakıyoruz. Ama
101 ve 102 zarar meydana çıktıktan sonra (exposs) uygulanıyor. Ama merger
doctrine böyle değil çünkü birleşme ve devralma bildirilecek ve bizim buna
iznimiz olup olmamasına göre birleşme ve devralma olacak diyor. KOmisyon da
burada cidden konsantrasyon var mı diye bakacak. Ondan sonra kendi mi yetkili
yoksa yerel otoriteler mi yetkili diye bakacak. Bunun için de geçen ders ki
thresholdslara bakacaktır. Ondan sonra da bu birleşme ve devralma sonrasında
meydana gelen yeni şirketler rakiplerinden, tüketicilerden bağımsız olarak
karar verebiliyorlar mı? Bu olmadna once de gerekli önlemleri almaya çalışıyor
bu regulation.
Slayt 1
Merger Regulation
139/2004
Art. 101 TFEU: Anti-competitive behavior of
more than two undertakings
Art. 102 TFEU: Anti-competitive behavior of one
dominant undertaking
Merger Regulation: checking the planned merger
before a dominant undertaking that might harm competition comes into existence.
Scope of MR:
1. Concentration
According to Article 3 (1) and (4) of the
Merger regulation concentration is deemd to arise where a change of control on
a lasting basis results
- from the merger of two or more previously
independent undertakings
or
-the acquisition by one or more undertakings,
whether by purchase of securities of assets, by contract or by any other means,
or direct of indirect control of the whole or parts of one or more undertakings
or
- the creation of a joint venture performing on
a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity.
The decisive factor is the criterion of gaining
control of one or more undertakings
which is defined in Article 3 (2) of the Merger Regulation as the possibility o
exercising decisive influence on an
undertaking.
Slayt 2
2. Turnover Thresholds
A merger has an EU dimension if the following
turnover criteria are met (article 1 (2) and 1 (3) of the merger regulation):
-The combined worldwide turnover of all the
undertakings concerned is more than € 5 billion
- the aggregate EU wide turnover of each of at
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than € 250 million
OR:
- the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of
all the undertakings concerned is more than € 2.5 billion
- the aggregate EU wide turnover of each of at
least two of the undertakings concerned is more than € 100 million,
-in each of the at least three Member States, the combined aggregate turnover of all
the undertakings concerned is more than € 100 million
Provisio (article 1 (2) and (3), end of last
sentences, of the merger regulation):
Where each of the companies concerned achieves
more than two-thirds of its EU-wide turnover (not its aggregate worldwide turnover!) within one and the
same Member State Member State
Slayt 3
Test for assessment of
mergers: Art. 2
·
‘
A concentration which would significantly impede effective
competition, in the common market or
in a substantial part of it, in particular by the creation or strengthening of
a dominant position, shall be declared incompatible with the comman market.’
The commission takes into account:
·
(a) the need to maintain and develop effective
competition within the common market in view of:
·
the
structure of all the markets concerned
·
(b) the market position of the undertakings
concerned and their economic and financial power, (market share)
·
thee
alternatives available to suppliers and users,
·
their
access to supplies or markets
·
any
legal or other barriers to entry,
·
supply
and demand trends for the relevant goods and services,
·
the
interests of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and
·
the
development of technical and economic progress provided that it is to
consumers’ advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition.
Finalde ağırlık
son konulardadır ama vize öncesi de dahildir. Yine aynı mantık olacak küçük
süpriz sorular.
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